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CLOTHES DON'T MAKE THE MAN (OR
WOMAN), BUT GENDER IDENTITY MIGHT
JENNIFER L. LEVP:
The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Jespersen v. Harrah's
Operating Co., Inc.' reflects the blinders on many contemporary courts
regarding the impact of sex-differentiated dress requirements on female
employees. Although some courts have acknowledged the impermissibility
of imposing sexually exploitive dress requirements,3 they have done so only
at the extreme outer limits, ignoring the concrete harms experienced by
women (and men) who are forced to conform to externally imposed gender
norms.
On the other hand, some transgender litigants have recently
succeeded in challenging sex-differentiated dress requirements. 4 This
success is due in part to their incorporation of disability claims based on the
health condition associated with each litigant's transgender identity.5 Such
an approach has allowed transgender litigants to introduce evidence of the

* Assistant Professor, Western New England College School of Law. Many thanks
to Jamison Colbum, Susan Donnelly, Anne Goldstein, Leora Harpaz, David Kaiser, Ben
Klein, Shannon Minter, and Barbara Noah for discussions about and review of this Article,
without which I could not have completed it. I am also indebted to Nik Andreopoulos,
Jeffrey Noonan, Maggie Solis, and the editors of this Journal for invaluable research
assistance and editing.

1Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), reh 'g
granted,409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005).
2 The Ninth Circuit has granted rehearing of the case en banc, which offers some
hope for reversal of the decision. See Jespersen, 409 F.3d 1061. Regardless of what happens
in the case, the panel decision underscores a major thesis of this Article, namely, that many
judges ignore the pain experienced by non-transgender persons of forced gender conformity.

3 See E.E.O.C. v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 611 (S.D.N.Y.
1981)
(ruling that an employee could not be required to wear a "sexually revealing... uniform");
Marentette v. Michigan Host Inc., 506 F.Supp. 909, 912 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (suggesting that a
sexually provocative dress code requirement would be impermissible).
4 See Lie v. Sky Publ'g Corp., 15 Mass. L. Rep. 412, 2002 WL 31492397,
at *8
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (allowing discrimination suit where the employer prohibited a
transgendered employee from wearing clothing consistent with her gender identity); Doe ex
rel. Doe v. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000) (allowing injunctive
relief for a transgender student barred from school for refusing to comply with sex-specific
dress code requirements).

5See Lie, 2002 WL 31492397 at *1; Doe, 2000 WL 33162199 at *8.
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6
essentialism of gender identity and its inelasticity for a specific individual.
In combining disability claims with sex discrimination claims, transgender
litigants have advanced a broader agenda of challenging normative beliefs
about gender for all persons, transgender and non-transgender alike.
Postmodem theorists who have exposed the social construction of
gender have been instrumental in expanding the scope of sex discrimination
laws. By showing that there is nothing natural or essential about
stereotypical assumptions about gender-for example, that women are
naturally weaker than men-these theorists have moved courts to help both
women and men out of the double binds that limit their career
advancement. 7 For example, most courts now recognize that enforcing
gender-based stereotypes that restrict women from being successful
investment bankers8 or men from being successful nursery school teachers?
amounts to sex discrimination.
However, there remains a seemingly impenetrable boundary to
successful challenges of widely accepted gender norms. This Article argues
that until courts understand the inelasticity of gender for most individuals
alongside its social construction, sex discrimination claims will have limited
utility.
Part I of this Article explores at least one root of the problem
influencing courts that hear dress code challenges-something this Article
6 See

infra note 104. See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994)

(defining a transsexual individual as "one who has '[a] rare psychiatric disorder in which a
person feels persistently uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex,' and who typically
seeks medical treatment including hormonal therapy and surgery to bring about a permanent
sex change" (quoting AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1006
(1989))).
7 The paradigmatic example

of this double bind was at issue in the case of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In that case, Ann Hopkins brought a sex
discrimination claim against Price Waterhouse after its failure to promote her to partnership.

Id. at 231-32. The double bind she faced was that she was denied partnership because of her
failure to act sufficiently feminine, and yet, had she acted feminine, she would assuredly also
have been denied. Id. at 235. At the time Hopkins was recommended for partner, Price
Waterhouse had 662 partners of which seven were women. Id. at 233. Hopkins was
recommended for partnership along with eighty-seven others, all of whom were men. Id.
8Id. at 251-52 (supporting a discrimination claim based on sex stereotyping by
those reviewing a female employee for promotion).
9See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1979).
The court considered Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery School, Inc., consolidated on appeal
with DeSantis, in which a male nursery school teacher alleged that he had been subjected to
gender discrimination when he was fired from his job shortly after he wore a small earring to
work. The court denied that he had suffered gender discrimination, instead classifying
discrimination based on non-conformance with gender stereotypes as akin to discrimination
based on sexual orientation. Id. at 332. Under the analysis of gender discrimination applied
by the Ninth Circuit in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1067-68 (9th Cir.
2002), it seems that the court would reach a different outcome today.
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will refer to as "the collective hunch theory," which others have referred to
as "normative stereotypes." It then analyzes the Jespersen case and
compares it to two other cases where transgender litigants brought
challenges to sex-differentiated dress codes. Part I concludes by analyzing
how the incorporation of disability claims by the transgender litigants
humanized their pain and, arguably, affected the outcomes of their cases.
Part II advocates bringing disability claims where available for transgender
plaintiffs and responds to some of the criticisms against doing so. Finally,
Part III offers suggestions for framing and litigating future dress code
challenges pursued on behalf of non-transgender litigants. In the process, it
highlights the limitations of the post-modem insight that gender is socially
constructed and its potential negative effect on cases brought by non
transgender litigants. Part III concludes by reconciling a seeming conflict
between the social construction theory of gender and the arguably
essentialist position advanced by this Article.
I. IGNORING HER PAIN, ACKNOWLEDGING THEIRS
A. Collective Hunch Theory
Unfortunately, the post-modem insight that gender is socially
constructed' 0 has not broadly convinced courts that every gender-based
distinction or requirement in the workplace is impermissible sex
discrimination. The limits of this insight are best seen in dress code cases,
where the Jespersen outcome-affirming a sex-differentiated dress and
appearance requirement-is common." Courts seem to reject these claims
1oSee Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals and CriticalGender Theory: The Possibility
ofa Restroom Labeled "Other," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1228-35, (1997) (discussing gender
as social construct and the tension between that idea and transsexualism); JUDITH BUTLER,
GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990).
1 See Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998)
(dismissing a challenge to a policy that prohibited men, but not women, from having long
hair); Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding
an employer's policy which required male employees to have short hair, but which did not
require the same for female employees); Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (7th
Cir. 1987) (dismissing a Title VII claim alleging that a grooming policy imposed unduly
harsh requirements on women); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755-56 (9th
Cir. 1977) (requiring male, but not female, employees to wear ties was not sex
discrimination under Title VII); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977)
(upholding a policy that limited the manner in which hair of men could be cut and that
limited the manner in which women's hair could be styled); Earwood v. Continental Se.
Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding sex differentiated grooming
standards consistent with Title VII); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685
(2d Cir. 1976) (upholding a policy which required short hair for men, but not women); Knott
v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding grooming policy
that "reflect[ed] customary modes of grooming" acceptable even though differences in
policy existed for men and women); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (upholding a policy that prohibited only men from wearing long hair); Austin v.
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based on the principle that, at some point, there is a zone of permissible
gender-based distinction' 2 based on what scholar Anthony Appiah calls
"normative stereotypes.'

Appiah defines a "normative stereotype" as a social consensus on
how members of a group should "behave in order to conform appropriately
3
to the norms associated with membership in their group.' He argues that
normative stereotypes and the different treatment groups receive as a result
of them are not negative or invidious because the stereotypes are based on
social norms, not intellectual error. 4 In arguably reductive fashion, Appiah
maintains that normative stereotypes are unobjectionable because they are
different from "false stereotypes," reflected in, for example, negative and
factually inaccurate racial stereotypes, and "statistical stereotypes," which
15
are sometimes true for some members of a group but not all. Appiah's
analysis, while helpful in describing differences among types of stereotypes,
does not explain why the ubiquity of social norms condones them. Instead,
Appiah suggests that social norms and normative stereotypes may be
enforceable because, at some level, the support for them is so widespread.
This unarticulated justification for creating an exception to non
discrimination law drives the Jespersen court's analysis.
A different characterization of the motivating principle behind the
Jespersen holding, as well as other cases upholding sex discriminatory
dress codes, is "the collective hunch theory." Under this theory, even if
there are some individuals harmed by certain gender-based requirements,
courts refuse to conclude that the imposition of gender-based requirements
could be actionable, particularly when imposed on non-transgender
individuals. The collective hunch is that gender requirements, especially
those concerning dress and appearance, are acceptable, and should survive
challenge in most circumstances. What seems to fuel this collective hunch
theory is that everyone has a gender identity and expression, meaning an
internalized or felt sense of being male or female, and that for most people
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (finding acceptable under
Title VII a grooming policy requiring male employees to maintain their hair length above the
collar); Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(upholding a "policy that prohibits to both sexes a style more often adopted by members of
one sex" under a Title VII challenge); Lanigan v. Bartlett and Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388,
1392 (D. Mo. 1979) (finding a sex discrimination claim insufficient where an employer
prohibited female, but not male, employees from wearing pantsuits in the executive office).
See K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CALIF. L.
REv. 41,48 (2000).
12

13

id.

14Id. at49.
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who identify as female, the expression of that gender identity coincides with
feminine, while for most people who identify as male, the expression of that
gender identity coincides with masculine. 16 Many judges hearing a
challenge to a sex-differentiated workplace rule imagine how they
themselves might respond and surmise that if they are comfortable with the
7
rule, then others should be as well.'
B. JespersenAnalysis
In Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., plaintiff Darlene
Jespersen, an employee of defendant company for twenty years, challenged
a sex-differentiated grooming policy imposed on Harrah's employees."8
Among other things, the policy required female, but not male, bartenders to
tease, curl, or style their hair and wear stockings and nail polish. 9 It also
required them to attend a "Personal Best" program which taught them how
to maximize their appearance and conform to that appearance on a daily
basis at their job.2 °
Jespersen found the requirements so inconsistent with her gender
identity that she ultimately declined to comply with them.2 ' Prior to the
implementation of the grooming code, Jespersen's employer had suggested,
but not required, that women employees wear make-up; Jespersen tried
wearing makeup for a short period of time,22 but stopped, however, when
16

For others, many of whom (but not all) identify as transgender, the fit is

otherwise.
17This analysis focuses on the judge because most of these cases are resolved on
dispositive motions. The collective hunch theory can as easily apply to jurors as judges.
18See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir.
2004), reh'g granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). For the previous twenty years that
Jespersen worked at Harrah's, her employer encouraged her and other female beverage
servers to wear makeup although it was not a job requirement. Id. at 1077. It was not until
2000 that Harrah's implemented its "Beverage Department Image Transformation" program,
imposing "appearance standards" on its employees. Id. Although all beverage servers,
regardless of gender, were required to "[be) well groomed, appealing to the eye, be firm and
body toned, and be comfortable with maintaining this look while wearing the specified
uniform," it incorporated sex-differentiated requirements to carry out its goals. Id. Notably,
women were required to wear colored nail polish, make-up, and styled hair; men were
prohibited from doing so. Id.
19 Id.

2Id. at 1078. Harrah's also required its male employees to abide
by the male
Personal Best standards, which included "maintain[ing] short haircuts and neatly trimmed
nails." Id. at. 1081.
21Id.

at 1077.
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she found that wearing it "made her feel sick, degraded, exposed, and
violated. 23 As the Ninth Circuit explained, she "felt that wearing makeup
'forced her to be feminine' and to become 'dolled up' like a sexual object,
a person."' 24
and . . . 'took away [her] credibility as an individual and as
Notably, during the litigation, Harrah's never questioned Jespersen's
sincerity regarding her response to the make-up requirement.
As a result of Jespersen's refusal to cooperate with the newly
imposed grooming policy, Harrah's terminated her. 25 Jespersen sued,
alleging that the "Personal Best" requirement constituted disparate
treatment based on sex discrimination. 26 The basis of her claim was
simple-the "Personal Best" program required women, but not men, to
conform to certain dress and make-up requirements and, therefore,
constituted disparate treatment based on sex.27 According to the Ninth
Circuit and well-established law, in order to prevail, Jespersen only had to
28
prove that "but for" her sex, she would have been treated differently. A
clearer case could hardly have been framed.
Notwithstanding the clarity and simplicity of her claim, the Ninth
Circuit rejected it in a surprisingly brief decision, finding that, although
different standards were imposed on male and female employees, there was
no class-based harm; Jespersen could not demonstrate that the differential
treatment amounted to an unequal burden on women. 2 9 Citing a broad
doctrinal exception to the general rule for proving a disparate treatment
claim, the court explained that it had "previously held that grooming and
appearance standards that apply differently to women and men do not
constitute discrimination on the basis of sex.",30 The court's interpretation of
this doctrinal exception was that, in the case of differential dress and
appearance standards, the court should apply an unequal burdens test that
focused on whether female employees are more significantly burdened than
their male counterparts. 3'

23

1d.

24 Id.
25

1Id. at 1078.

26

Id.

271d. at 1081.
21
29

30

Id. at 1079-80.
1d.

at 1083.

1d. at 1080.

31 id.
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As an initial matter, the Ninth Circuit's suggestion that an "unequal
burdens" test is automatically applicable in dress code cases conflicts with
precedent. Since dress codes and sex discrimination are not mutually
exclusive categories, many courts have delineated the circumstances where
sex-differentiated dress codes violate prohibitions against discrimination.
They have not uniformly done so by comparing requirements for male and
female employees in the workplace.32 While it is hard to reconcile these
inconsistent outcomes, some generalizations can be drawn, at least as to
when dress codes violate sex discrimination prohibitions. For example,
some courts have struck down sex-differentiated dress codes because they
were applied differently to men and women without sufficient
justification. 33 Others have held that even a sex-neutral dress code may
violate the law if it is applied in a discriminatory fashion. 34 Still others have
struck down sex-specific dress codes because a particular hardship fell on
only one sex in its application.35
While courts have used the "unequal burdens" language in
evaluating the legitimacy of dress codes, they have generally not applied
that test as mechanistically as the Ninth Circuit did in Jespersen, essentially
evaluating whether the "Personal Best" program imposed the same time
burdens on men and women. 36 The Ninth Circuit characterized the

32

See infranotes 33-35 and accompanying text.

33 See Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602,
609 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding Continental's desire to compete by featuring attractive female cabin attendants
insufficient to support a discriminatory weight requirement).
34

See Harding v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 929 F. Supp. 1402, 1406 (D.
Kan.
1996) (considering evidence that a "no tank tops" requirement only applied to female
employees could support inference of sex discrimination); Tamimi v. Howard Johnson Co.,
807 F.2d 1550, 1553-54 (11 th Cir. 1987) (finding that the creation of facially neutral makeup
rule was evidence of a pretext for sex discrimination).
35 See O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656
F. Supp. 263,
266 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (finding a dress code requiring female sales clerks to wear a "smock"
while allowing male sales clerks to wear shirts and ties impermissible, even absent a
discriminatory motive, because it perpetuated sexual stereotypes); E.E.O.C. v. Sage Realty
Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding a sexually provocative uniform
requirement impermissible); Marentette v. Michigan Host, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909, 912 (E.D.
Mich. 1980) (concluding that a sexually provocative dress code may violate Title VII);
Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028, 1029-30 (7th Cir.
1979) (striking down a dress code that required women to wear a uniform but allowed men
to wear business suits).
36 Cf Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 605-06. The court considered the "burdens" on women
in comparison to men in deciding the discrimination claim, but the discussion of "burdens"
came in response to defendant's argument. The defendant argued that its policy was similar
to previous policies that had been upheld by the court, and the court proceeded to distinguish
the case before it by focusing on the unduly harsh burdens imposed solely on women.
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37
application of this test to Jespersen as one of first impression, arguably
because it misinterpreted the unequal burdens precedent.
Further, rather than acknowledging that sex discrimination law
protects individuals, not just classes of individuals, the Ninth Circuit turned
Title VII on its head by interpreting its precedent to mean that Jespersen
could not prevail unless her case demonstrated that all women are burdened,
not just those who, like her, are offended and harmed by having to wear
make-up. As a result, the Ninth Circuit departed from well-established law.
Moreover, even if the court had correctly identified how other courts had
applied the unequal burdens test, the Harrah's policy could not have
survived it. The court basically concluded that Jespersen could not prove
her case because she had not introduced evidence that could establish that
wearing make-up on a daily basis pursuant to the "Personal Best" program
would take more money or time than was required by the men to "maintain
short haircuts and neatly trimmed nails. '38 One can only conclude that the
judges either never applied make-up on a daily basis or drew their
conclusion so reflexively that they could not imagine the extra time, energy,
and money the makeup rule required.3 9

C. Behind the Jespersen Analysis
The Jespersen outcome, though wrong, was not surprising, given
the widespread notion that forced conformity to normative beliefs about
appropriate gender expression is perfectly acceptable. This notion is hard to
justify under any application of a disparate treatment test. Taken seriously,
disparate treatment means just that-a female plaintiff may prove a claim
by demonstrating a male employee would be treated differently. By
definition, sex-differentiated dress and appearance requirements are
disparate treatment. Regardless, since many challenges to them have failed,
a closer analysis is warranted.4 °
The justifications for sustaining sex-differentiated dress codes, both
theoretical and judicial, can best be characterized as lacking substance.
37 See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir.
2004), reh"ggranted,409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005).
3

1Id. at 1081.

39Perhaps the easiest way to expose the flaw in the court's analysis is to recognize
that both women and men had to maintain haircuts and have neat-appearing nails. Id. The
women's requirements to wear make-up, stockings, nail polish, and have teased, styled, or
curled hair was above and beyond those minimal requirements imposed on both men and
women.
40 See supra note 11. See also Annotation, Employer's Enforcement of Dress or
Grooming Policy as Unlawful Employment PracticeUnder § 703(a) of Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.CA. § 2000e 2(A)), 27 A.L.R. Fed. 274, § 3 (2005) (discussing numerous

failed dress code and grooming policy challenges).
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Perhaps more charitably, they could be referred to as defense by analogical
reasoning. The proponent of sex distinctions argues that, because all, or at
least most, persons would agree that it is not harmful to enforce some sex
stereotypes, figuring out where to draw the line when enforcement is
inappropriate entails drawing the line around widely shared normative
beliefs about appropriate gender expression.
This form of defense has been advanced, for example, by Robert
Post.41 Professor Post looks for examples of employment that discriminate
on the basis of sex that he believes most would agree are justified.42 The
examples he considers concern matters of privacy where an individual-a
woman in all of his scenarios-is exposed or vulnerable. Because he
believes most people would want a court to sustain a sex-differentiated job
requirement in such circumstances, he maintains that the disparate treatment
is not unlawful.43 Finding the right example is key to Post's argument, and
the ones he chooses are those to which nearly everyone can relate, since
even if the reader has never been in a comparably vulnerable position, he or
she can imagine a relative, dependent, or friend who has or could be. His
quintessential example is when an elderly woman has to be bathed. 44 Post
argues that, naturally, the elderly woman should be able to preference hiring
a female attendant, a position supported by at least one court. 45 In doing so,
he presumes that there is little harm associated with this normative belief
about what people are or are not uncomfortable with. This, of course,
ignores the harm to the male applicant who has no interest in invading
anyone's privacy, is qualified for the position, and needs the money.
The problem with Post's reasoning, much like the problem with the
Jespersen court's analysis, is that no amount of hand-waving or analogical
reasoning can deny the fact that, despite widespread normative beliefs and
conformity to gender stereotypes, many people do suffer real harm from
being subjected to these beliefs and stereotypes. Further, not everyone
46
shares
prevailing
societal
The who
difficulty
for societal
courts isnorms
that judges
who are,
by and large,
mennorms.
and women
share the
do not

41

See

Robert

AntidiscriminationLaw, 88
42

Post,
CAL.

Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
L. REv. 1 (2000).

Id. at 16-17.

43

1 d. at 25-26.

44Id.

at 25 (citing Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del.

1978)).
45 See Fesel, 447 F. Supp. at 1353-54.
46 For a particularly poignant account of the pain one person experienced as a
result of not sharing prevailing societal gender norms, including forced hospitalization and
curative therapy, see DAPHNE SCHOLINSKI, THE LAST TIME I WoRE A DRESS (1997).
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Therefore,
experience the harms associated with forced gender conformity.
47
causes.
it
harm
the
of
extent
the
they often cannot imagine
D. The Transgender Cases
In contrast to Jespersen, cases where litigants have been
transgender, and therefore better able to plead and highlight the specific
harms of forced conformity, have afforded plaintiffs more success.
48
Consider, for example, the case of Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits. Pat Doe was
a fifteen-year-old student who sued the principal of her junior high school
49
when he refused to allow her to attend school wearing girls' clothing. Pat
had been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (hereinafter "GID") and,
50
although born biologically male, she had a female gender identity. As a
result, her treating therapist concluded "that it was medically and clinically
necessary for plaintiff to wear clothing consistent with the female gender
1
and that failure to do so could cause harm to plaintiff s mental health.""
Although the court did not describe it as such, the case, in essence,
was a challenge to a sex-differentiated dress code. The policy itself was
gender neutral, prohibiting "clothing which could be disruptive or
distractive to the educational process or which could affect the safety of
students. 52 As interpreted by the principal, however, this meant that Doe, a
biologically male student, could not wear "padded bras, skirts or dresses, or
wigs." 53 By contrast, biologically female students were not categorically
prohibited from wearing such clothing. As a result, the case, like Jespersen,
was a dress code challenge.
In ruling in Doe's favor, the court did not even mention any dress
code exceptions to sex discrimination law. Rather, the court applied the
Perhaps more accurately, most judges cannot understand the extreme harm
gender conformity. They likely do have some concept of how forced
forced
caused by
gender conformity affects individuals like themselves. However, because they may have
experienced it as simply a minor inconvenience (because they have never faced forced
conformity to a gender norm in any way grossly inconsistent with their gender identity) it is
easy to minimize a litigant's related (but vastly different) experience. After all, if judges
have no experience with which to compare a case before them, then they are less likely to
use themselves as a measure of evaluating the plaintiff's experience.
17

4'2000 WL 33162199 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000). This author served as counsel for
Pat Doe in her capacity as Senior Staff Attorney at Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders.
49

1d. at

*1.

50 id.
51Id.
52

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

3 . at *2.
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traditional disparate treatment rule to which the Jespersen court adverted.
As the Doe court explained, "the right question is whether a female student
would be disciplined for wearing items of clothes plaintiff chooses to wear.
If the answer to that question is no, plaintiff is being discriminated against
54
on the basis of her sex, which is biologically male.
The court did distinguish the case from one that found a dress code
exception.5 5 However, the distinction was based on the reason why plaintiff
challenged the dress requirement.5 6 Notably, in distinguishing the case from
one affirming a sex-specific dress code, the court found relevant that the
plaintiff sought to wear girls' clothing in order to express her personal
identity, holding that suppression of that identity, simply because it "departs
from community standards," would be impermissible. 7
By way of distinguishing the Jespersen analysis, it is useful to
consider a second case involving, essentially, a dress code challenge. In
Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Systems, a transsexual plaintiff brought a
claim against her employer when she was terminated during the process of
transitioning from male to female.58 Carla Enriquez had been a practicing
pediatrician for over twenty years when she was hired by defendant West
Jersey Health Systems to be the medical director of an outpatient treatment
facility. 59 Less than a year after being hired, she began the process of
transitioning. 60 She "shaved her beard and eventually removed all vestiges
of facial hair. She sculpted and waxed her eyebrows, pierced her ears,
started wearing emerald stone earrings, and began growing breasts.", 61
Several co-workers and supervisors grew uncomfortable with her process of
transitioning in the workplace and confronted her.62 According to Enriquez,
one supervisor told her to "stop all this and go back to your previous
appearance!" 63 Following some administrative changes at her place of
41d. at *6.
55

Id. (citing Harper v. Edgewood Bd. of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 1353
(S.D. Ohio

56

id.

1987)).

51Id. at *6 n.5.

58 Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 367 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001).
59id.
60

Id. at 368.

61

id.

62

Id.
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64
employment, Enriquez was required to renegotiate her contract. At that
time she was told, "[N]o one's going to sign this contract unless you stop
this business that you're doing., 65 The implication was clearly that, unless
she conformed to male gendered stereotypes, her employment would not be
66
continued. Shortly thereafter, Enriquez was terminated.
Although not explicitly a dress code case because no dress code
was cited as justification, Enriquez's underlying sex discrimination claim is
doctrinally indistinguishable from those brought by Pat Doe and Darlene
67
Jespersen. As in Doe, the Enriquez court sustained the plaintiffs claim.
The court never considered whether there was some exception to sex
discrimination law for dress codes. It did, however, analyze whether there
68
was some exception to sex discrimination law for transsexual persons. It
concluded that there was not.69
One key difference between Jespersen on the one hand and Doe
and Enriquez on the other is the incorporation of disability claims on behalf
of Doe and Enriquez, and, more importantly, extensive discussion of the
centrality of gender expression and its inelasticity. 70 While completely
irrelevant to the sex discrimination claim, the existence of the disability
claim itself allowed the introduction of evidence relating to the condition of
being transgender and the sincere reasons why the plaintiff could not
7
conform to a sex-differentiated dress requirement. ' As a result, the Doe and
Enriquez courts had a more specific and concrete understanding of how
painful it is to require the plaintiff to conform to the particular expectation
of gender at issue in the case. Even though the harm of gender conformity
had no relevance to the sex discrimination claim, the outcome in the two
cases was quite different.
Notably, both the Doe and Enriquez decisions reflected the fact that
the courts could imagine the specific harm a transgender litigant might

64id.
65

66

Id. (alteration inoriginal).
1d.

67Id. at 380.
68

69

/d. at 371-73.
1d. at 373.

See id. at 369-70; Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *2-6 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 2000).
70

71 See

Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 370-71 (describing in depth the plaintiffs gender

dysphoria diagnosis); Doe, 2000 WL 33162199, at *7 (describing gender-specific dress code
requirements as "stifling of [the] plaintiffs selfhood").
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experience from forced conformity to gender norms.72 For example, in
Enriquez, the New Jersey Superior Court referred in detail to a letter
Enriquez wished to send to her patients explaining her condition. The letter,
in part, stated:
Current research tells us that early in fetal development, the
infant's brain undergoes masciilinization or feminization
unrelated to chromosomal complement. Later, as we grow up, we
identify with the 'cortical' or brain gender we were endowed with.
Happily, for the majority of the population, the genetic (or
chromosomal gender) and the cortical (or brain gender) are
congruent.... [S]ome people do not have this harmony. We call
these feelings 'dysphoria' in medicine. Literally, this means
'unhappy,' but doctors have expanded its meaning to describe
conditions that significantly effect [sic] the individual. Gender
Dysphoria describes a condition in which there is not this
harmony. The physical and the inner selves are at odds.73
Although irrelevant to the sex discrimination claim or its analysis,
the language seemed to move the court in its interpretation of the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination. Acknowledging that some states are
split on the issue of whether transgender people are excluded from state sex
discrimination laws,74 the New Jersey court concluded that
it is incomprehensible to us that our Legislature would ban
discrimination against heterosexual men and women; against
homosexual men and women; against bisexual men and women;
71 See Doe, 2000 WL 33162199, at *8. The court stated
that the school had
suspended Doe "on account of the expression of her very identity," and in ruling in Doe's
favor, the court considered the harm that Doe would suffer if she was not allowed to return
to school in clothing which conformed to her gender identity. "[I]f plaintiff is barred from
school, the potential harm to plaintiff's sense of self-worth and social development [would
be] irreparable." See Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 373. The court discussed gender and its relation
to one's sense of self before concluding that the law should prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sex or gender. In the end, the court agreed with the notion that "a person's sex or
sexuality embraces an individual's gender, that is, one's self-image, the deep psychological
or emotional sense of sexual identity and character." Id. (citation omitted).
73 See Enriquez, 777 A.2d at
370.
74 Id. at 372. The court considered the following cases before coming to its
conclusion: Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Iowa 1983)
(concluding that the word "sex" in Iowa's Civil Rights Act does not include transsexual
people); James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 478, 481 (D. Kan. 1995)
(holding that a male-to-female transsexual could not sue for discrimination under Kansas
law); Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding
that, under the District of Columbia's Human Rights Act, transsexuality is not a "sex");
Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395-96 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (interpreting the
word "sex" in a state anti-discrimination law to include transsexual people).
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against men and women who are perceived, presumed or
identified by others as not conforming to the stereotypical notions
of how men and women behave, but would condone
discrimination against men or women who seek to change their
anatomical sex because they suffer from a gender identity
disorder.75
It is likely that the incorporation of the medical information relating to the
compelling reasons why someone would undergo that physical
transformation moved the court in its analysis.
Similarly, in Doe, the plaintiff stated as part of her case that she
was diagnosed with childhood GID and that it was due to this diagnosis that
a treating therapist advised that it was medically and clinically necessary for
76
the plaintiff to wear clothing consistent with her female gender identity. In
the context of a student plaintiff, this information seemed to move the court
in framing the question as it did-whether the school would treat a
biologically female student the same by similarly disciplining her for
wearing female clothing. 77 If not, the court concluded, the plaintiff could
prove her disparate treatment claim. 78 Importantly, the court understood that
Doe was motivated to wear the clothing for which she was disciplined for
79
genuine reasons and not for the purposes of causing disruption. This

allowed the court to distinguish the case from others in which courts
s
disallowed related claims brought by non-transgender litigants.8
Comparison of these cases suggests that successes have been
achieved on behalf of transgender litigants because litigating sex
discrimination in those cases offers a vehicle for challenging normative
beliefs about gender in a way that is less threatening to the non-transgender
judges who adjudicate them. In other words, because courts have been able
conceptually to marginalize the impact of their decisions to a minority
community (of transgender persons), it may be easier for them to allow
7
76

Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 373.
See Doe, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1.

Id.at *6 (stating that "[s]ince plaintiff identifies with the female gender, the
right question is whether a female student would be disciplined for wearing items of clothes
77

plaintiff chooses to wear").
78 id.
79

1d.

at 6 n.5.

Id. (distinguishing Harper v. Edgewood Bd. of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 1353 (S.D.
Ohio 1987)). As the Doe court explained, in Harper,the student plaintiffs were unsuccessful
because their challenge to a gender-specific prom dress code stemmed from "rebellious acts
to demonstrate a willingness to violate community norms," and was not for the purpose of
expressing their personal identity.
80
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some small incursion into widely-held beliefs about the fundamental
differences between men and women.
In contrast to the understanding of the Doe and Enriquez courts of
the plaintiffs' perceived need to violate gender norms, the Jespersen court
belittled the burden that a sex-differentiated dress code imposed on the
plaintiff, all but ignoring the individual harm alleged.
II. IN DEFENSE OF DISABILITY
Bringing a disability claim along with a sex discrimination claim
has sometimes been the key to successful challenges of sex-differentiated
dress codes. It humanizes the plaintiff, helps convince courts of the
seriousness of the underlying claims, and counteracts the collective hunch
theory by giving a judge a basis for removing him or herself as the
evaluator of the harm of a sex-differentiated rule. A disability claim gives a
court a construct for understanding why someone cannot conform to a
gender stereotype and does so in language a judge can understand. That is,
different health conditions are widely understood to change the way an
individual might respond to a particular job requirement, making the judge
without the health condition a poor arbiter of the job requirement's effects.
By incorporating a medical claim associated with one's gender identity or
gender expression, courts can distance themselves from the particular facts
and circumstances of a case and take seriously the dysphoria experienced
by a plaintiff's forced conformity to a gender norm.
Nevertheless, some have criticized the incorporation of disability
counts into claims of discrimination brought by transgender litigants. The
basis of the criticisms is not the effectiveness of bringing a disability
claim. 8' Rather, the criticisms stem principally from the stigma of disability
81As an initial matter, of course, federal disability law, the Americans
with

Disabilities Act, and the Federal Rehabilitation Act contain an express exclusion for
transgender litigants. See 42 U.S.C. § 1221 l(b)(1) (2005). Despite this exclusion at the
federal level, many state (and local) laws contain no such express exclusion and have been
used successfully by transgender litigants. See Jette v. Honey Farms Mini Market, 2001 WL
1602799, at *3 (Mass. Comm'n Against Disc. 2001) (interpreting a Massachusetts
discrimination statute as providing protection for transsexual people); Enriquez v. West.
Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 373 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (finding protection
for transsexual persons under New Jersey discrimination statute); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits,
2000 WL 33162199, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000) (finding Massachusetts law against sex
discrimination applicable where a student with GID was prevented from wearing feminine
clothing); Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395-96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995)
(interpreting the word "sex" in a New York City ordinance prohibiting discrimination as
protective of transsexual people); Doe v. Electro-Craft Corp., 1988 WL 1091932, at *7 (N.H.
Super. 1988) (concluding that New Hampshire law against discrimination does encompass
protection for transsexualism as a protected handicap). See also Smith v. City ofJacksonville
Corr. Inst, 1991 WL 833882, at *14 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hrgs. 1991) (holding that an
individual with gender dysphoria is within the disability coverage of the Florida Human
Rights Act, as well as the portions of the Act prohibiting discrimination based on perceived
disability); Evans v. Hamburger Hamlet & Forcrook, 1996 WL 941676, at *9 (Chi. Com.
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and reflect central misunderstandings of disability law. Four basic criticisms
emerge. First, people have a reflexive aversion to being included within the
2
stigmatized community of disability. Second, some argue that a disability
theory is under-inclusive because it may not be available to all persons who
identify as transgender, specifically those who reject a medical diagnosis as
being at the root of their identity. Third, a class-based critique raises a
83
concern about the medicalization of the transgender condition. Finally, a
post-modem approach that seeks to disaggregate sex and gender concludes
84
that, because all gender is culturally defined, an essentialist approach,
85
which only crassly describes a disability model, should be rejected.
The first of these objections, rooted in the stigma associated with
health conditions, should not guide litigation choices because it exacerbates
the stigma that disability laws seek to redress while ignoring the reality of
the transgender condition and identity for many individuals. As to the first
of these points, the distinction between the use of the word "disability" in
non-discrimination laws and its use in, for example, entitlement programs
must be noted. The purpose of disability non-discrimination laws is to
protect individuals who, despite a health condition, are able to86work but are
prevented from doing so because of the prejudice of others. As a result,
the word "disability" that appears in non-discrimination laws describes a
health condition, but not conditions that preclude an individual from
performing the essential elements of a job with or without
accommodation.87 In other words, unlike the word "disability" that appears
Hum. Rel. 1996) (denying the defendant's motion to dismiss a disability claim brought by a
transsexual plaintiff).
See Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 34 (2003). Spade relates the concern that "trans people do not want to be
seen as 'disabled' because it implies that to be transgendered is to be flawed.
82

Id. at 35. Spade expresses particular concern that the use of disability claims and
the medical model of gender identity disorder in general means that lower income
individuals will be denied protections available to wealthier individuals because they lack
the resources necessary to access a GID diagnosis.
83

84 Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregationof Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1995).

8s These objections, and an affirmative case for bringing disability claims on

behalf of transgender individuals, have been made elsewhere.

TRANSGENDER RIGHTS

(Paisley

Currah et al. eds., forthcoming 2006).
86 LAURA

F. ROTHSTEIN,

DISABILITIES AND THE LAW 26-27,266

(2d ed. 1997).

See Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 279-80 (11 th Cir. 1994) (finding
that an employee with rheumatoid arthritis who was terminated from housekeeping job did
not have a valid discrimination claim because he was unable to meet his job attendance
requirements).
87
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in entitlement programs," the language of non-discrimination law does not
reflect the use of the word "disability" in the vernacular.8 9
As a result, the main point of disability law is to ensure that
individuals who can work despite having a health condition (or having a
history of such condition or being perceived as such) should not be
prevented from doing so because of the stigma attached to the condition.
To avoid relying on disability law for protections because of stigma would
exacerbate the problem the laws seek to redress.
Getting beyond the stigma associated with the law, some
transgender, as well as non-transgender, individuals balk at relying on such
law because of the often incorporated requirement that a litigant
demonstrate that the health condition limits a major life activity. 90 For many
transgender people, of course, the condition of being transgender has no
impact on their lives. For others, however, the identity or condition, without
any medical intervention or care, is seriously limiting. 9 1 Acknowledging
this fact does not, however, universalize that experience or suggest that to
be the case for everyone who identifies as transgender. Nor does
acknowledging that fact require that every transgender individual follow
any particular course of care or treatment for the condition.92
In addition, most disability laws cover not just individuals with a
particular health condition but also those who have a history of such
See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(c)(1) (2005). Supplemental Security Income payments are
"determined on the basis of the individual's ... income, resources, and other relevant
characteristics," indicating that the program was designed to provide a minimum income to
those who are unable to work. In this context, "disabled individual" clearly refers to a person
who is unable to work.
38

89

See WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 642 (1993). Among the
definitions of "disability" is "an inability to do something" and "the condition of being
disabled."

90 Spade, supra note 82, at 33-34.
91See Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 175 (D. Mass. 2002) (finding that
an inmate with GID did not receive adequate medical care for a serious medical need
because a prison official initiated a blanket policy restricting the treatment options doctors
could prescribe for inmates).
92 See Franklin H. Romeo, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for
a New
Conceptionof GenderIdentity in the Law, 36 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REv. 713, 730-32 (2005)
(discussing the shortcomings of courts' reliance on the "medical model" when dealing with
transgender litigants). Romeo believes that the medical model is tilted toward those who
have the means to access the health care system, and that it does not protect gender
nonconforming people who are unable to access trans-friendly health care, intersex people
who refuse 'corrective' medical procedures, people who identify as genderqueer or
otherwise express nontraditional gender identities, people who are unable to physically
modify their bodies, and those who choose not to undergo surgical and hormonal treatments
in order to express their gender. Id.
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93
condition or are regarded as having such a condition. Therefore, even for
those persons whose transgender identity or condition does not lead to
medical care or treatment, disability laws may provide protections as well.
The stigma and misunderstandings, therefore, associated both with
disability law and transgender identity should not limit the availability of
those laws to persons who face discrimination.
In addition to objections based on stigma and under-inclusion, the
two remaining most common objections to pursuing disability protections
stem from concerns about class and the social construction of gender. The
articulation of the first of these objections comes mainly in the form of the
following: by pursuing disability law as an avenue for protecting
transgender people, many transgender people facing discrimination will not
be covered because they cannot afford access to the medical system, either
to formally be diagnosed with some condition, like GID, or to purchase
hormones or surgeries. 94 Responding to this objection is straightforward. A
medical diagnosis is neither necessary nor sufficient to meet the legal
definition of disability in most states. 95 More fundamentally, one need not
demonstrate that one is receiving medical care or treatment in order to
that he or she has experienced discrimination on the basis of
demonstrate
96

disability.

93 See Michalski v. Reuven-Bar Levav & Assoc. P.C., 625 N.W.2d 754, 759-60

(Mich. 2001). The court interpreted the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act as
requiring the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff was regarded as having a determinable
physical or mental characteristic; the perceived characteristic was regarded as substantially
limiting one or more of the plaintiff's major life activities; and the perceived characteristic
was regarded as being unrelated either to the plaintiffs ability to perform the duties of a
particular job or position or to the plaintiffs qualification for employment or promotion. Id.;
see Chevron Corp. v. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tex. 1987) (in considering the Texas
antidiscrimination statute, the court found that "in order for a disability to be considered a
handicap in the first place it must be one which is generally perceived as severely limiting
him in performing work-related functions in general").
94 Spade, supra note 84, at 35-36.

95 Connecticut is one of the rare jurisdictions that defines disability to track
disorders included within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, at least
as to mental disabilities. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-540 (2004). See also Conway v. City of
Hartford, 1997 WL 78585, at *4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997).
See, e.g., Sanglap v. LaSalle Bank, FSB, 345 F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir. 2003)
(finding "that liability for disability discrimination does not require professional
understanding of the plaintiffs condition. It is enough to show that the defendant knew of
symptoms raising an inference that the plaintiff was disabled"); Martinson v. Kinney Shoe
Corp., 104 F.3d 683, 686 (4th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that employee may prove
discrimination on account of disability by showing that termination was due to physical
manifestations of "'specific attributes' of his disease"). In Martinson, the termination was
due to employee's epileptic seizures. In downgrading the importance of determining whether
the termination was due to the epilepsy itself or due to the seizures, the court stated that "[t]o
fire for seizures is to fire for a disability." Id.
96
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An alternate way to see the fallacy of this objection is to consider it
in the context of any other health condition. Would someone possibly object
to a person with cancer bringing a claim of disability discrimination simply
because the individual could not afford medical treatment for their cancer?
Would one possibly object to a pregnant woman bringing a claim of
pregnancy discrimination simply because she could not afford pre-natal
care?
To ask these questions, hopefully, is to answer them. The ability to
afford medical care or treatment is no element of stating a claim of
disability discrimination. Moreover, to object to pursuing such claims from
a class-based analysis is to turn the analysis on its head. The result of that
position is to deny poor people with health conditions protection from
discrimination that is otherwise extended to persons of means, an untenable
position particularly from the progressive position that launched it.
The second of the latter two objections comes from the postmodem perspective that all gender is socially constructed and that there is
nothing essential about gender identity.9 7 This Article fundamentally rejects
the premise that there is nothing essential about gender identity upon which
this objection is made. Even accepting the underlying premise as true,
however, there are several responses to it. First, it bears mentioning that this
objection, taken to its logical conclusion, posits that transsexualism does not
exist. In other words, this perspective implies that if people could fully
embrace their masculinity (from the female-to-male ("FTM") perspective)
or femininity (from the male-to-female perspective), despite the social
construction of biologically female traits as feminine or biologically male
traits as masculine, no one would ever need to take hormones or have
surgery to fully express their gender identity. The objection essentially
argues that, if masculinity could be re-socially constructed to include any
form of chest, then someone who identifies as FTM would not need or want
to have chest surgery. This questioning of trans-identity is deeply offensive
to many transsexuals and somewhat surprising to those within the
transgender community.
Second, a rejection of this objection comes from within the
transgender community in the form of an acknowledgement of the
interrelatedness of a disease model of disability (which is not even reflected
in disability non-discrimination laws as distinct from entitlement programs)
and environmental factors. As physician Nick Gorton has explained, a
commonplace understanding of disease is that it is "a clinically significant
adverse effect or experience for an organism due to an interaction between
one or more biological traits of that organism and the environment in which

97 See supra note
11.
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it resides. ' 8 In other words, a disease model itself takes into account the
fact that a particular health condition may be present in one's body and,
depending on the environment, either have or not have an adverse or
disabling effect. The example Gorton offers is non-insulin dependent
diabetes mellitus ("NIDDM"). According to Gorton, the genes that in the
"developed world result in NIDDM are not a disease when abstracted from
their environment." 99 Consequently, if one lives in an environment where
food is not in abundance and where people lead non-sedentary lives, then
the same genes that in a different context are destructive are actually
beneficial because of their greater potential to store fat and preserve energy.
NIDDM only results in disease, that is, a "clinically significant adverse
effect," where an individual with such genes is in fact is harmed by said
genes.
What Gorton's argument illustrates is that the transgender condition
is neither essentially bad nor good; that is to say, like having NIDDM,
being transgender is neither disabling nor benign, at least not in a vacuum.
However, the environment in which the condition is experienced ultimately
determines whether it constitutes a disabling condition (what he calls
disease) or not.' ° Therefore, even for persons who ascribe to a socially
contingent understanding of gender identity, a disability discrimination
model is appropriate.
Finally, the underlying disagreement about the essentialism of
gender, and more specifically transgender identity, need not be resolved in
order to advocate pursuing disability protection. Both disability and genderbased claims can be pursued where the discrimination a transgender person
experiences is rooted in both. Likely, no one would argue that a Jewish
person with Gaucher disease' 0 ' should not pursue both disability and

98 Nick Gordon, Toward a Resolution of GID, the Model of Disease, and the
Transgender Community, http://www.makezine.org/giddisease.htm (last visited Dec. 20,

2005).
99Id.

debate is not exclusive to the transgender community. Other health
conditions are sometimes argued not to constitute disability, often by insurance providers
that wish to avoid coverage of a condition. Consider, for example, the condition of infertility,
which has no consequences to one's life absent the desire to have children. One could argue
that the condition is a socially constructed one. However, accepting that premise does not
refute the serious, adverse consequences for one who has the health condition. In recognition
of that, many states have adopted laws to require coverage for the condition of infertility.
See, e.g., ALM GL CH. 175, § 47H (2005); 215 ILCS 5/356m (2005); TEX.INS. CODE §
1366.003 (2005); CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 1374.55 (2005).
100 This

101Gaucher disease is a lipid storage disorder, prevalent among Jewish people of
Eastern European ancestry, which causes enlargement of the spleen or liver, anemia, and
bone problems. The carrier rate for Gaucher disease may be as high as one in fourteen
among Jewish people of Eastern European ancestry, in comparison to one in 100 among
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religion-based claims simply because there is nothing essential about
religion or because not all Jewish persons have Gaucher disease. Finding
redress for discrimination hardly creates identity characteristics and,
certainly, avoiding identity-based discrimination claims does nothing
further to question them.
I. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED AND APPLIED
What relevance, if any, does this debate have to Darlene Jespersen,
a non-transgender employee terminated as a result of the enforcement of
gender stereotypes? Post-modem challenges to the essentialism of gender
notwithstanding, non-transgender litigants have a tremendous amount to
learn from transgender litigants. Some suits brought by transgender litigants
have moved courts forward in their understanding about the inelasticity of
gender for such persons. A medical model has allowed litigators to
introduce scientifically-based reasoning that for certain persons, the
requirement that they conform to normative stereotypes is exceedingly
harmful. Perhaps believing that it is only at the margins of the community
that the imposition of normative stereotypes is harmful, some courts have
allowed their imposition. Because doing so at the margins would not
transform the social norm itself, or its force in the main, such courts have
not necessarily departed from the collective hunch theory. 10 2 For example,
in Doe and Enriquez, two state courts agreed that a school's and an
employer's enforcement of normative gender stereotypes of dress and
appearance impermissibly excluded persons from an education and a work
environment, respectively.
The job now for litigators advancing similar claims for non
transgender litigants is to convince courts that the harms experienced by
these plaintiffs is every bit as real and significant as that experienced by the
transgender litigants. Part of the difficulty of this challenge is the courts'
(over-)identification with non-transgender litigants and their subscription to
the collective hunch theory. 103 The role of progressive lawyers and litigants
concerned about the harmful effects of enforced gender norms should be to
call into question the collective hunch by exposing its limited applicability.
those in the general population. See National Gaucher Foundation Homepage,
http://www.gaucherdisease.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
102 As the New Jersey Superior Court explained, "A person who is discriminated
against because he changes his gender from male to female is being discriminated against
because he or she is a member of a very small minority whose condition remains
incomprehensible to most individuals." Enriquez v. West. Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365,
372 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2001) (emphasis added).
103 IS conformity to gender norms even so easy for most individuals, given all the
energy put into their continued enforcement? In other words, why would anyone care about
the policing of gender norms when it is so easy for everyone to fall into them? The author
would like to thank Anne Goldstein for raising these questions.
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Post-modem social constructionists have gone far in laying the
groundwork for robust enforcement of sex discrimination laws. It is, after
all, their insight that nothing is natural or essential about sex stereotypes
that has, in significant part, moved sex discrimination jurisprudence beyond
cases protecting women qua women and men qua men. As a result of that
critical work, courts have acknowledged claims rooted in enforcement of
invidious stereotypes as sex discrimination.
The limits of the post-modem insight may be seen, however, in
cases like Jespersen. What may move courts beyond those limits is to
strengthen and personalize the harm in the same ways that incorporating
disability claims into cases brought by transgender litigants has done. A
critical point to be made in future cases is that a person's core sense of
gender identity is innate and impervious to change. 104This is true for
transgender and non-transgender individuals alike:
[J]ust as a person's core gender identity as male or female is
innate, a person's relative degree of masculinity or femininity is
also deep-seated and generally impervious to manipulation or
change. While individuals can alter the way they dress and can
change their appearance to some degree through the use of make
up and other accessories, there is a core aspect of gender identity
and gender expression that is deeply rooted and that cannot be
changed.' 0 5
One author has advanced an interesting thought experiment that
be
used effectively in litigation. Daphne Scholinski writes and asks
could
readers to imagine being forced to express their gender identity in a way
inconsistent with their sense of self, and to imagine doing so not as a lark,
but rather as against one's will-first, for a day, then for a week, and then
for an extended period of time. "Try changing things," she instructs. 10 6 "Try
This issue was raised before the Ninth Circuit. Brief of National Center for
Lesbian Rights & Transgender Law Center as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Jespersen
v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15045). The brief
'04

cites the following to support this principle: Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp.2d 156, 163 (D.

Mass. 2002) ("The consensus of medical professionals is that transsexualism is biological
and innate."); Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76, 78 (S.D. Tex. 1980) ("Most, if not all,

specialists in gender identity are agreed that the transsexual condition establishes itself very
early, before the child is capable of elective choice in the matter, probably in the first two
years of life; some say even earlier, before birth during the fetal period."); In re Heilig, 816
A.2d 68, 78 (Md. Ct. App. 2003). The Heilig court stated that, "[b]ecause transsexualism is

universally recognized as inherent, rather than chosen, psychotherapy will never succeed in
'curing' the patient." Id. at n.13.
105 See Brief of National Center for Lesbian Rights & Transgender Law Center,
supra note 105.
106 SCHOLINSKI,

supra note 46, at xi.
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it. Wear an outfit that is utterly foreign-a narrow skirt when what you
prefer is a loose shift of a dress. Tom-up black jeans when what you like are
pin-striped wool trousers. See how far you can contradict your nature. Feel
how your soul rebels."' 0 7 For most people who seriously engage the thought
experiment, the result is the same-serious discomfort that could translate
into humiliation and degradation of one's sense of self. For a judge, or even
a jury, willing to seriously undertake this exercise, the result hopefully
would be to push the boundaries of the collective hunch theory.
One final comment about the interplay between the post-modem
approach of social construction and the inelasticity of gender identity bears
mention. While these approaches may seem diametrically opposed, they are
easily reconciled. At the most basic level, even physical objects, much less
ideas or concepts, can be both in motion and unmoving (at rest), at the same
time depending on the point of reference. This fundamental concept, which
inspired Albert Einstein to develop his theory of relativity,'l 8 is based on
Einstein's observation of two trains in motion. He recognized that, to a
person traveling at sixty miles per hour on a train in motion, another person
sitting in a second train moving at precisely the same speed appears to be at
rest. Indeed, the person sitting on either train, when asked, would answer
that he or she is sitting still. Einstein's observation illustrates in a physical
context the same phenomenon offered by this Article, that gender may be
socially constructed and responsive to social, political, and cultural
pressures, but that a given individual's gender identity remains impervious
to change.
Another way to reconcile these seemingly inconsistent positions is
to acknowledge that, although the descriptive aspect of gender may be
socially constructed, as an ascriptive facet of human identity, gender is not
socially constructed for any particular individual. That is to say, even
though lives are given meaning and structured by social norms that are
contingent, the fact still remains that for any given individual, the
experience of inhabiting those norms feels, and in some sense is, noncontingent.
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108 Einstein makes extensive use of the train analogy in his popular book,
RELATIVITY: THE SPECIAL AND GENERAL THEORY

(Robert W. Lawson trans., 1961). Einstein

also used the analogy of observing moving trains in his original article on special relativity,
published in 1905. Einstein, Zur Elektrodynamikbewegter Koerper [On the electrodynamics
of moving bodies], 17 Annalen der Physik 891-921 (1905). An English translation of the
paper is available in

JOHN STACHEL, EINSTEIN'S MIRACULOUS YEAR: FIVE PAPERS THAT
CHANGED THE FACE OF PHYSICS 123-60 (2d ed. 2005). On the third page, Einstein invokes a

moving train to introduce his ideas about simultaneity: "We have to bear in mind that all our
judgments involving time are always judgments about simultaneous events. If, for example, I
say that 'the train arrives here at 7 o'clock,' that means, more or less, 'the pointing of the
small hand of my watch to 7and the arrival of the train are simultaneous events."' Id. at 125.
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ClothesDon 't Make the Man (or Woman)
IV. CONCLUSION

Cases in which courts affirm the enforcement of sex-differentiated
dress requirements in employment reveal how little judges understand the
harms associated with forced gender conformity for persons whose gender
identity and expression are not shared by the judges. Cases brought by
transgender litigants provide insight into what may move judges to
understand both the harms of forced gender conformity for those
individuals and the inelasticity of gender identity. Part of the insight is that
medicalizing the experience of gender identity both strengthens the realness
of the claims and offers a way for judges to remove themselves as the
appropriate measure for the discomfort a litigant may experience.
Objections to bringing disability claims on behalf of transgender litigants
are principally rooted in misunderstandings of disability law and should be
rejected by progressive minded advocates and litigants. The rejection of
these objections clears the way for non-transgender litigants to bolster
challenges to sex-differentiated dress requirements and to advance a
conception of gender identity that ultimately strengthens claims brought by
transgender and non-transgender plaintiffs alike.

